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Abstract: Political lobbyists are a part of government decision-making pro-
cesses, and many countries have stringent regulations to ensure their activi-
ties are somewhat transparent, especially as some use ethically questionable 
tactics. In New Zealand, however, there are no similar legislative regulations, 
and lobbyists can stay undetected while trying to influence policymaking. 
More concerning, however, is that the results of this study indicates that lob-
byists are also able to skirt around scrutiny in New Zealand media because 
of current journalism practices. This research’s content analysis indicates 
the media neglects to identify lobby organisations, thereby allowing them to 
operate without detection of their agenda, leaving the public unaware of who 
is influencing decision makers. 
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Introduction
IN DEMOCRATIC countries there is growing concern of lobbyists who try to work below the radar and ensure the public is unaware of who and what are influencing legislative decisions. As outlined in the literature review below, a 
growing concern is ‘astroturfing’ whereby the lobby group creates benign-look-
ing spokespeople or groups to put forward their case, and the real clients are able 
to stay concealed in the background (Hager, 2014; Fitzpatrick & Palenchar, 2006; 
Stauber & Rampton, 2004). It is challenging for media to investigate the founda-
tion of such groups to expose them as faux. It would seem easy, however, to iden-
tify lobby groups as such when they are the ones speaking out in the media, but 
this study found this was not so. This research initially questioned if journalists 
identified political pressure groups accurately as ‘lobbyists’ or used a more palat-
able label such as ‘advocacy’, ‘government relations’, or ‘single interest’ group. 
The results were surprising in that the media camouflaged the lobby groups by 
not identifying them at all, using no labels to identify them.
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A lack of academic research into lobbying in New Zealand meant that 
much background information for this study is from previous news stories and 
a handful of textbooks. Many of the news stories focused on one-off examples 
like Members of Parliament accepting perks from lobbyists, such as tickets to 
Rugby World Cup games, or lobbyists being issued coveted Parliamentary access 
swipe cards.  In 2014, however, investigative journalist Nicky Hager published 
the book Dirty Politics based on a series of leaked emails, which described a 
covert and manipulative relationship between lobbyists, the government and 
prominent right-wing bloggers. The information in Hager’s book sparked our 
study on the visibility of lobbyist’s activities.  This article explores how the New 
Zealand media identify lobbying groups, which would ensure news audiences 
are aware of the agenda behind a group’s media stance or statement.    
Literature review
New Zealand’s Parliament does not have an official definition for lobbying, 
however the two-decade old Kent handbook on lobbying in New Zealand 
(1998) describes lobbying as: ‘the modern communication art of ensuring your 
opinions are heard by decision makers’ (p. 6); and the UK Public Affairs coun-
cil expands the definition to explain that it is attempting to influence ‘govern-
ment, parliament, the devolved legislatures or administrations, regional or lo-
cal government or other public bodies in any matter within their competence’ 
(UKPAC, 2014).  Simply put, the objective of lobbying is mobilising public 
opinion to create pressure on decision makers for competitive advantage or 
commercial gain (Harris, 2002). 
While lobbyists sometimes play an important role in the decision-making 
process by alerting politicians to the viewpoint of some stakeholders, they ‘carry 
a negative connotation in the public’ (Greisser, 2013, p. 36), and the tactics used 
by some practitioners has brought them into disrepute publically  (Berg, 2012; 
Thomson & John, 2007; Zetter, 2008). Lobbyists are generally mistrusted by 
the public and that there is a view that they ‘in some way distort the political 
process’, a reputation blemished when it appears that well-funded groups can 
hire lobbyists to pressure policymakers to consider their viewpoint more than 
those with less of a voice (Thomson & John, 2007, p. 4). As a result, many 
political actors and public servants are reluctant to admit that they have contact 
with lobbyists, or that they receive valuable and useful advice and briefings 
from them (ibid). This poor reputation led to the American association for lob-
byists to change its name in 2014 to ‘The Association of Government Relations 
Professionals’ (Yaeger, 2013).
Transparency in New Zealand
New Zealand has no formal register of lobbyists, unlike a number of other 
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Western democracies such as Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, 
Lithuania, Netherlands, Poland and the United States, which have legislation 
that control lobbying activity among public officials and ensure it is visible 
(Krsmanovic, D. 2014; Malone, 2004). In 2012, a Green Party’s attempt to de-
velop a register and improve transparency was thwarted when Parliament voted 
down the Lobbying Disclosure Bill, which outlined: 
There is no public scrutiny of the activities of people who are paid to 
lobby parliamentarians, their staff, or public servants. Nor is there any 
code of ethics. This means there is no way of knowing who is engaged in 
the lobbying process, who is lobbying whom, and for what purpose (p. 1).
The bill would have established a register of lobbyists and required them to 
comply with a code of conduct. It also would have required them to file annual 
returns with the Auditor-General. The main reason for the bill’s failure was the 
difficulty in defining what a lobbyist was, as well as the proposed law would 
have captured not just professional lobbyists, but anyone wanting to contact 
their MP about any issue (Crang, 2013).
Without mandatory registration it is difficult to easily identify who is actively 
involved in lobbying MPs. Some idea can be gleaned from the 105 submissions 
to the Lobbying Disclosure Bill (Parliament, 2013).  Among the industries oppos-
ing legislation to register lobbyists were: advertising, brewing, energy, farming, 
financial services, banking, horticulture, hospitality, tertiary education, fast food, 
meat, forestry, accounting, law, pork, retailers, winegrowers, newspaper publish-
ing, fishing, retirement villages, unions and, not surprisingly, public relations. 
Besides the difficulty in identifying who is lobbying MPs, it is also difficult to 
assess how many there are. A 2004 report on lobbying by the National University 
of Ireland’s Institute of Public Administration found there was ‘very little literature 
on this subject in New Zealand at the moment’ (Malone, 2004, p. 17). The only 
hint is based on anecdotal evidence, such as from former Cabinet Minister Tre-
vor Mallard who stated that there was an increasing trend in organisations using 
lobbyists, and he predicted it would grow moreso.  ‘Lobbying as a practice and a 
discipline is going to get more sophisticated and more common’ (Mallard, 2003, 
§63). Ten years after Mallard’s prediction, this growth was evident when the num-
ber of lobbyists granted access cards to enter Parliament buildings doubled, to 25 
(Young, 2013). Another indication of the growth may be seen in the expansion of 
the closely-related public relations industry. Since the 1940s, the number of public 
relations practitioners has increased markedly (Hager, 2012). There are now more 
than 1350 members of New Zealand’s Public Relations Institute, however there 
are many more who are not members (PRINZ, 2017). 
Another indication of the number of lobbyists is to look to other Western 
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democracies. In Australia, there were 597 registered lobbyists representing 1735 
clients in 2016 (Australian Government Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, 
2017).  This register excludes lobbyists working for charities, religious groups 
and NGOs, so the total figure is estimated to be more than 1000 active lobbyists 
working in Canberra (Hogan et al., 2011). In the USA there were 11,166 registered 
lobbyists in 2016, with businesses spending more than US$3 billion each year on 
the activity (Center for Responsive Politics, 2017). The real number, however, is 
estimated to be 100,000 lobbyists and $9 billion annual spending, as the industry 
is finding new ways to keep its activities private (Fang, 2014).  According to an 
investigation by The Nation news magazine (ibid), lobbyists have found legislative 
loopholes to let them escape the registration list, and lobbying in America is going 
‘underground’ so as to be invisible  (§8).  Furthermore, lobbyists are employing 
secret tactics, such as ‘the development of increasingly sophisticated strategies 
that enlist third-party validators and create faux-grassroots campaigns’, which 
hide their real identity and motives (§9). 
New Zealand lobbying tactics
The scene is similar in New Zealand, where success in public relations and lob-
bying occurs when the public is not aware of it happening or who is responsible 
for it, according to independent investigative journalist and author Nicky Hager 
who has written a number of books about New Zealand politics where lobby-
ists played a part (Hager, 2014).  The common practice of using third-person 
groups to influence lawmakers is also verified by New Zealand Public Rela-
tions And Communications Management textbook, which outlines the tactics 
used by lobbyists as ‘direct’ when meeting with officials and making public 
submissions to government, and ‘indirect’, when influencing public opinions 
by email writing campaigns, publicity stunts, and encouraging friendly MPs to 
ask questions in the House (Mersham, Theunissen, & Peart, 2009). An increas-
ingly-used indirect lobbying tactic is  to stay in the background and support 
experts and proponents to speak up in the media (ibid.). 
Another, more secretive, tactic is astroturfing, which Hager (2012) described 
as a ‘manipulative public relations’ practice (p. 212). Astroturfing involves 
manufacturing supporters, such as creating false community support groups, 
secret employment of seemingly independent scientists, spying on opponents 
and attacking opposing experts (ibid).  Astroturfing is a controversial tactic of-
ten used in the USA, which aims to influence decision makers by making them 
believe there is overwhelming public support for a particular position, when in 
reality it is fabricated by the lobbying business (Fitzpatrick & Palenchar, 2006). 
According to Mersham, Theunissen and Peart (2009) astroturfing should be 
avoided.  ‘It is deemed as highly unethical because it is misleading and thus 
little more than propaganda’ (p. 184). In an investigation into public relations 
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in the USA, Stauber and Rampton (2004) stated ‘even PR practitioners use the 
term (astroturfing) to deride their competitors’ work’ (p.79).
Despite the unethical nature of astroturfing, at least two such campaigns have 
received publicity in New Zealand. One was a political and media campaign 
aimed at promoting logging of native forests, and involved the fabrication of a 
pro-logging campaign by creating a fake pro-logging community group, secretly 
paying so-called independent scientists employed to support logging, employing 
spies to report on activities by counter groups, and attacking funding sources 
of scientists on the other side opposed to logging (Hager 2012). All of this was 
aimed at gaining favourable media coverage for logging and influencing public 
opinion. Another example was the benign-sounding Association of Community 
Retailers, which was in fact set up and funded by Imperial Tobacco, to protest 
tobacco-related legislation (Ng, 2010).  
Lobbying and the media
A convenient vehicle for lobbyists to disseminate their political messages is the 
general media, which is the primary channel for receiving information about 
decisions and decision makers for most citizens (Stromback, 2008), but as Cal-
laghan and Schnell (2001) state, the public is often ‘at the mercy of the media 
and other key political agents who meet as combatants in the policy arena and 
determine how issue debates and policy alternatives will be structured and de-
fined’ (p. 183). In determining what is newsworthy, journalists sort through a 
large amount of information to determine what is likely to be considered most 
relevant by citizens (Louw, 2010). It is in the interest of lobbyists to attempt 
to influence what is being reported and how it is framed (Hager, 2012). Many 
public relations practitioners are skilled in media and understand how to frame 
issues to meet news values, (Comrie, 2002). Lobbyists may influence politi-
cians by getting the media to report their issue in a way advantageous to their 
cause (Thompson & John, 2007). 
A recent trend helping lobbyists push their messages is the commercialisation 
or private control of the news media where revenue is largely reliant on adver-
tising, described as ‘the great crisis in journalism today’ (McChesney, 2012, p. 
683).  The need for news organisations to make ever-increasing profits to satisfy 
shareholders, combined with ownership of media organisations shifting from a 
multitude of different companies to a handful of media corporations, has seen 
a decline in both the quantity and quality of journalism (McChesney, 2012). In 
the period between 2000 and 2012, McChesney (2012) estimates the amount 
of both labour and resources going into producing new stories in the USA had 
dropped by 30 percent, blaming commercialisation for the number of publica-
tions decreasing, as are the number of reporters (ibid.). The watchdog role of 
media is weakened and the decline in newsroom staff negatively impacts on the 
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investigation and generation of original news stories, resulting in an increase in 
‘unfiltered public relations’ being reported as news (p. 686). McChesney con-
tends that ‘slashing’ journalism staff allows illegal activities of lobbyists to go 
undetected, and culprits, such as lobbyists Jack Abramoff, who was sentenced 
to six years in prison for conspiracy to bribe public officials, mail fraud and tax 
evasion, would go undetected and unreported in future (p. 685). 
In New Zealand, public relations practitioners ‘far outnumber the news 
organisations and their shrinking staffs’ (Hager, 2012, p. 212). In addition, pub-
lic relations practitioners are generally more experienced than their reporting 
counterparts (Comrie, 2002). As an example of the success of public relations 
practitioners to get their messages picked up by the media, research by Comrie 
in 1997 showed that of 66 press releases issued by two New Zealand Crown 
Health Enterprises, 54 were published by media with 97 stories resulting (Comrie, 
1997). Another study of 674 newspaper articles published during the controversial 
debate over allowing generic engineering found two-thirds omitted contextual 
information on how the journalist received the quotes or information, such as a 
media release, news conference, interview (Rupar, 2006). The study also found 
that business sources were more likely to have no contextual  information ‘had 
less-questioned access to the news’ than other sources (p. 137). Rupar called 
for more precision in journalism (a term credited to Myer, 1991) by including 
in news stories the motive and method of the sources. Her study indicated the 
reason for giving business groups an unfettered entry into a news story could be 
the result of business groups’ army of public relations staff who produce well-
written media releases ready for newspapers to publish without extra effort. If 
readers are informed that the information came from a media release, they know 
there are commercial interests at stake and therefore ‘factual certainty produces 
transparency and clarity of news and is relevant for public rebates on important 
issues in society’ (p. 134).
Theoretical foundation:  Media framing
It is understandable that the media keep news items concise by taking shortcuts 
in the words used to describe events or sources, and these selected words can 
help frame understanding of the context of the news articles (Haskell, 2011). 
The media framing theory posits that news articles give contextual clues to help 
the public evaluate the subjects of the articles, but these contextual cues can 
promote interpretations for the issues and events being covered and, thereby, 
influence public opinion (Haskell, 2011). How the media frames a news story 
can have a negative effect by eliminating voices and weakening arguments  and 
this allows the media to ‘frame issues in ways that favour a particular side 
without showing explicit bias’, (Tankard, 2001, p. 95). The power of framing 
stems from media defining a debate without the public realising they are being 
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influenced, and an example given by Tankard was the reporting of the Water-
gate case, when public opinion shifted against US President Nixon after the 
media moved from describing it as the ‘Watergate caper’ to a “national political 
scandal at the highest level”’ (p. 97). While framing is necessary in reporting, 
Haskell (2011) states these should be neutral, which includes how sources in 
the story are described. 
This research project looked at how the New Zealand media describe the 
sources of information, when the source is in reality a lobby group. This goes to 
the foundation writing rules for journalists, who are taught to adequately identify 
sources and their credentials or agendas for being included in the story (Hannis, 
2014; Reuters, 2015).  It is also enshrined in most media codes of ethics (such as 
EPMU, 2011;  International Federation of Journalists, 1986; Society of Profes-
sional Journalists, 2014) that instil on professional journalists to strive to find 
the truth, and not hide relevant information from their audiences.   
As discussed in the literature review above, lobbying is a common practice 
in democracies that foster differing viewpoints, but it becomes suspect when it 
employs tactics that keep them out of the public view and the policymakers are 
led to think the general public, not personal-interest groups, hold these viewpoints. 
This is where the media framing and transparency is involved—in putting the 
spotlight on the lobby activities so the public knows who is behind each view-
point, and their respective political or commercial agendas. It is only with this 
full knowledge that news audiences can adequately weigh up differing opinions 
and decide which to support, and that policymakers can assess how much public 
support, rather that partisan support, is displayed. When two opposing sides try to 
reframe their argument with positive verbiage, citizens should be able to rely on 
the news media to put each side in context. Journalists and the news media are the 
ones who accurately describe a group, rather than clouding it with euphemisms or 
leaving them invisible. This research inspected how the media frames lobbyists in 
news stories and whether or not they accurately describing lobbyists, or allowed 
them to remain camouflaged in the background. The research used content analy-
sis to analyse stories produced by the two major newspaper/online news services 
and used interviews to gain viewpoints from two independent observers of New 
Zealand Parliament.  
Research method 
This research used traditional content analysis of news articles published over a 
three-month period between January 1 and March 31, 2015, on the websites of 
the two largest newspaper organisations in New Zealand, which published 21 
(80 percent) of the country’s daily newspapers at the time of the sampling. The 
full text of the articles to be analysed were sourced from Fairfax New Zealand’s 
Stuff website (stuff.co.nz), which draws news from its ten daily newspapers, 
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two weekend papers, and 65 regional and specialist newspapers; and New Zea-
land Media and Entertainment’s (NZME) The New Zealand Herald’s website 
(herald.co.nz), which draws from its two weekend newspapers, six daily news-
papers, and 20 regional newspapers. Both websites were searched using the ad-
vanced Google search option, which allows for date parameters to be set. In or-
der to ensure the research captured only the work of reporters in New Zealand, 
the sample excluded letters to the editor, articles written by overseas journalists 
and republished in New Zealand and opinion pieces written by non-journalists.
The sample was 817 news articles that mentioned any of the 20 prominent 
New Zealand lobby groups, which representing a mixture of business and public 
interest causes. The analysis determined how frequently these groups were cited, 
and what descriptors, if any, were applied to them in the news stories. 
The second stage was interviews with two people from differing industries 
who have observed New Zealand parliament and lobbying over several decades. 
The first was an academic scholar who has observed Parliament leadership since 
the 1960s, Dr Margaret Hayward. She had worked within Parliament for many 
years, before turning to researching it. The second interview was with former 
senior journalist and director since 1984 of an influential Wellington-based media 
management public relations company, Karen Barnsley. The interview partici-
pants were given the results of the content analysis and asked their viewpoint.  
Results
Content analysis results
A total of 817 news stories mentioning one of the 20 selected lobby groups 
were published on the websites (Table 1). Of those, 458 were published on Stuff 
and 359 on The New Zealand Herald website. Of the 817 articles, 90 percent 
(N=739) did not contain any descriptors to describe or label the lobby group, 
and used only the group’s name. In only 10 percent (N=78) was any kind of 
label used to describe the group at all. In only 3 percent (N=21) was the label 
lobby applied to identify the group as a lobby group.  
A third of the news articles (N=252) reported the groups’ political message, 
an indirect method of getting their side of an issue to politician and policy mak-
ers. Only 8 percent (N=21) of these articles used the word ‘lobby’ and only 18 
percent (N=46) used any descriptor at all. Looking at it the other way, the results 
showed 82 percent of articles expounding the lobbyist message did not declare 
their interest or agenda. 
Looking at the 78 articles in which any descriptor labels were used, lobby was 
the most often used label at 27 percent (N=21), and the group that most often was 
given the descriptor lobby by the media was climate change group Generation 
Zero, with half of the 16 articles written about them using the term. Other terms 
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Lobby group Others (specify)
Federated 
Farmers 273 3 1.1 58 2 1 - - - - - -
Influential organisation, 
farmer body
Business New 
Zealand 4 0 0 4 0 - - - - - - -
Chamber of 
Commerce 151 4 2.7 42 3 - - - - 1 - -
Voice of business, business 
leaders, stakeholder
EMA 15 3 20 2 1 - - - - - - -
Food and Gro-
cery Council 9 2 33.3 3 1 - - - - - 1 - Industry chiefs
Straterra 1 1 100 1 1 - - - - 1 - -
The New Zea-
land Initiative 10 9 90 7 6 1 - - - - - 8
NZ Retailers 
Association 5 1 20 4 1 - - - - - - - Retailers
Hospitality 
New Zealand 18 2 11.1 7 2 - - - - - - -
Hospitality leaders, part 
of alcohol industry
Taxpayers 
Union 26 4 15.4 25 4 3 - - - - - - Watchdog group
Greenpeace 22 2 9 11 0 - - - - - - - Not eco terrorists, environmental group
Grey Power 40 1 2.5 21 1 1 - - - - - -
Forest and 
Bird 11 2 18 4 2 - - - - - - -
Conservationists, 
environmental group
SPCA 130 6 4.6 6 1 - - 2 3 - - - Animal activists
Environmen-
tal Defence 11 5 45.5 10 5 - - - - - - -
Environmental group (4), 
environmental community
Sensible 
Sentencing 
Trust
42 5 11.9 24 2 2 1 - - - - -
A group wanting tougher 
penaltiesfor crime, child 
exploitation and sexual 
abuse  advocates
Family First NZ 16 3 18.8 3 0 2 - - - - - - Kill joys
Paw Justice 8 8 100 1 1 - 3 1 4 - - -
Generation 
Zero 16 11 75.0 13 9 8 - - - - - -
Climate change group, 
environmental groups, 
cycleways supporter
ASH 9 6 66.7 6 4 3 1 - - - - - Anti-smoking group, anti-smoking purists
Total 817 78 9.6% 252 46 21 5 3 7 2 3 8 31
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used for this group were climate change group, environmental group and cycleway 
supporters. Other groups to receive the lobby group label were: the Taxpayers 
Union (N=3), Action on Smoking and Health (N=3), Sensible Sentencing Trust 
(N=2), Family First New Zealand (N=2), Grey Power (N=1), The New Zealand 
Initiative (N=1) and Federated Farmers (N=1). The next most frequently used label 
was think tank, which was used exclusively in the eight articles about New Zealand 
Initiative. Interestingly, this is the term the group called itself in its media releases. 
The description welfare group and charity group was used 14 percent (N=11) for 
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (SPCA) and 5 percent (N=4) for 
Paw Justice. Again, these are terms the animal protection groups use themselves 
in their media statements.   
The three powerful lobby groups that generated large amounts of media 
stories during this sample period received few or no descriptors at all. Of the 
273 stories that included a mention of farming lobby group Federated Farmers 
only 1 percent (N=3) included a descriptor:  lobby, influential organisation and 
farmer body.  Of the 151 stories on the Chamber of Commerce only 3 percent 
(N=4) used a label: voice of business, business leaders, stakeholder and busi-
ness group. Of the 130 stories on the SPCA, only 5 percent (N=6) included a 
descriptor:  charity, welfare, and animal activist. 
Interview results 
Dr Margaret Hayward first observed New Zealand lobbying in 1967 when it 
was ‘normally a whisky under the arm’ and nice ‘pally talk’ to the party lead-
ers or involved minister, but she recognised that it has become more sophisti-
cated and more centred on the media. Based on her observations, she was not 
surprised by the results of the content analysis, but was alarmed at the media 
practice.  She said from a public accountability viewpoint it was dangerous for 
the media to skip over the step of properly identifying a key player in a news 
story. She estimated most online news consumers would be unaware that these 
groups were pressure groups, and most citizens were not aware of lobbying oc-
curring in New Zealand: 
The situation is deceitful.  I don’t think the journalists are deliberately be-
ing deceitful, although I have suspicious about the lobbyists, but overall 
the picture is that people are deceived…. I’m not happy about anonymity.  
They hide behind the fact most people think these groups are speaking 
out of goodwill, and not because they want a privileged position or want 
legislation that will give them a competitive advantage. 
Karen Barnsley, director of a public relations company specialising in media 
management, acknowledged that some organisations might prefer to be able to 
give media statements without being identified as having a vested interest in an 
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issue, but she pointed out that this was unfair to organisations on the other side 
of the controversy or issue. She said if a news article gave conflicting opinions 
where one side was identified as a lobby group and the other side was not iden-
tified as such, it benefitted one side and not the other. 
Discussion
This study showed most (90 percent) news articles did not describe lobby 
groups’ agenda in any way, simply using the groups’ formal name. Only one-
tenth of the 817 news stories used any kind of label to describe the groups’ 
relationship to lobbying. In several cases the labels used by the journalists were 
simply those provided by the lobby group itself. It is accepted practice for re-
porters to provide a designation or descriptor for the individuals or organisa-
tions they cite in news stories (Hannis, 2014, p. 207), but this sample indicated 
they are not doing so. It is apparent from the results of the content analysis that 
lobby groups are able to disseminate their messages without the public aware 
of their agendas. Without this clear description in news stories, the public are 
being left in the dark and not being given the information with which to make 
well-informed decisions. This has an important implication for democracy, as 
without the full information, the public may not be aware of the motives behind 
some political decisions. 
As example, it appears from the research that an organisation such as the 
powerful Federated Farmers, which was given a label in only 1 percent of the 
273 stories that included a mention of them, can act without the public being 
aware or reminded of their motivations for commenting on and trying to influ-
ence government policy for the commercial benefit of their members. Without 
this understanding of Federated Farmers’ role, the public could easily think 
they are simply an agriculture-related company. To report only the name of an 
organisation and no further descriptors means that audiences are left to draw 
their own conclusions about what the group is about and what its motivations 
are from the content of the story, or sometimes even from just the organisation’s 
name. As an example, the Taxpayer’s Union, which was labelled as a lobby 
group in only three of the 26 stories, has a name that indicates to the public that 
it represents taxpayers. While this may be the group’s intention, without further 
investigation, or information from the media, the public will be unaware that it 
is a lobby group for a right wing political movement. One news story descriptor 
supported this misunderstanding by labelling them a watchdog group. Similarly, 
the Christian moral organisation Family First New Zealand received only three 
descriptors in the 16 stories written about them. While two of these were lobby 
group, the third descriptor, kill joys, was perhaps more in keeping with some 
people’s views of its activities. 
It is significant that almost one-third of the articles mentioning the lobby 
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groups was specifically on the message they wanted to get across to the policy 
makers. This is using the media as a vehicle to possibly sway decision-making. 
The concern is that a vast majority of these (82 percent) on-message news articles 
omitted describing the lobby group as such, thereby possibly camouflaging the 
commercial interest of the viewpoint. 
It is beyond the scope of this study to determine why reporters are failing to 
provide such basic information in their news reporting. It is possible that some 
become so familiar with the groups they deal with that they assume the public 
also knows this. It is also possible that with the commercial pressures and down-
sizing of newsrooms, as outlined by McChesney (2012), reporters simply do not 
have the time or the resources to properly investigate the groups they are dealing 
with, especially if the information is mainly from a media release from the group 
(Comrie, 1997). It is also concerning to see an almost complete absence of the 
lobby group label being applied to the influential, big business lobby groups such 
as Federated Farmers, Business New Zealand and the Chamber of Commerce. 
These results mirror the lack of journalism precision and transparency 
shown in Rupar’s 2006 analysis of GE-debate news articles whereby most 
articles omitted information on the journalists’ method of newsgathering (such 
as the information was sourced from media releases, websites, interviews, or 
media conferences). Similar to our study, Rupar also found that newsmakers 
representing big business interests were given less transparent context in the 
story compared to other groups.  
The seasoned Parliamentary observer Dr Margaret Hayward describes the 
media practice of not identifying lobby groups when giving them publicity as 
alarming and dangerous from the point of view of an informed public. She likened 
it to journalists giving lobby groups anonymity. This lack of transparency also 
affects other groups who are trying to make their viewpoint heard.  As pointed 
out by public relations director Karen Barnsley, it could be unfair when a news 
story reports conflicting opinions by pressure groups, but only one is identified 
as a lobbyist and the other group is not.
Conclusion
This study originally set out to explore if the media used lobbyist rather than 
other euphemisms to describe political pressure groups.  It was a surprising re-
sult to find the media was not using any term to describe them, leaving it up to 
the readers to make assumptions as to the motives and agenda of those quoted 
in a news article. The nature of lobbying is such that it is advantageous for them 
to be able to covertly persuade policy makers—away from the public view 
and public scrutiny.  Tactics such as astroturfing are considered unethical and 
are specifically to hide the fact that it is lobbyists who are putting pressure on 
policy makers. By not fully identifying lobby groups’, journalists are helping 
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downplay their agendas, instead of showing their true aim of trying to pressure 
government for the benefit of specific businesses or industries.
The media often is accused of framing a news story in a certain way by the 
words and descriptors they use, but in this instance the media is framing-by-
omission, which downplays the significance of the lobby groups’ motives. This 
research did not look at the reason behind the lack of descriptors, but the finding 
that several labels used in news stories were simply those supplied by the pressure 
groups themselves lead to an assumption a contributing factor is the current trend 
toward a more commercialised media and the resulting downsizing of newsroom 
staff. In other words, the journalists have less time to adequately put context into 
the news articles. The absence of transparency is particularly alarming now that 
lobbying seems to be played out more through the media rather than directly in 
Parliament itself. The research in this project indicates that the media are failing 
to inform their audiences, and, as a result, audiences may be in the dark about 
which groups are lobbyists and which are not.  This has implications for the 
democratic process whereby citizens may not be aware which lobby groups are 
trying to influence lawmakers and what laws they want changed. 
The intent of this study was to explore how the news media frame lobbying 
activities in New Zealand. It is apparent from the results that framing-by-omission 
is in practice and thereby the media is helping lobbyists keep their motives out of 
the glare of news media spotlight.  This study is one of the few research projects 
on New Zealand media treatment of lobbyists, and clearly indicates that with 
90 percent of stories omitting any description of lobby groups, and 97 percent 
avoiding the word lobbyist completely, the news consuming public could feel 
uninformed. This is particularly significant in New Zealand which, unlike many 
other Western countries, lacks a legal register or code of ethics for lobbyists. In 
summary, it appears that inaction by both the media and Parliament allow hired 
pressure groups to stay camouflaged when trying to influence New Zealand 
policy makers on behalf of their clients.   
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